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Is Turkey a Rival to the European Union? 
Neo-Ottoman Influence in the Balkans
Ghazi Ghazi
Oakland University
Abstract
 Turkey, under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s presidency, has begun to re-animate some 
aspects of its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire. Many observers of Turkey speak of “Neo-
Ottomanism,” both at home and in its foreign policy. With respect to the latter, aspects of 
neo-Ottomanism are very evident with Turkey’s engagement in the Balkans. As European 
Union (EU) accession seems more and more unlikely for Turkey, one might wonder if 
Turkish actions in the Balkans can be seen as trying to rival the EU for influence. This pa-
per thus seeks to answer two questions. First, what factors are motivating Turkish foreign 
policy, and does Turkey’s neo-Ottoman influence in the Balkans make it a competitor or a 
partner to the EU? This paper will look at Turkish policies in the Balkan region, focusing 
particularly on Bosnia and Moldova, and analyze whether its growing influence is making it 
a competitor to the EU.
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1. Introduction
 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been the dominant figure in Turkey in the 21st century, 
serving as Prime Minister (2003-2014) and now occupying a newly empowered presidency 
(2014-present). Erdoğan’s rise to power has transformed the Turkish state, domestically and 
internationally (Rodenbeck, 2016). One important aspect of Erdoğan’s presidency that has 
had domestic and international implications is his neo-Ottoman policies. These policies 
have been criticized by Western nations as increasingly authoritative and nationalistic. Some 
critics have perceived Erdoğan’s policies as grounded exclusively in religion, but this is not 
the case (Rodenbeck, 2016). His neo-Ottoman policies have more cultural motives than 
they do religious ones, particularly in the case of the Gagauz people in Moldova.
 This paper seeks to answer two questions. First, what factors are motivating Turk-
ish foreign policy?  Second, does Turkey’s neo-Ottoman influence in the Balkans make it a 
competitor or a partner to the EU? This paper will examine Turkey’s increasing economic 
and political influence in the Balkans, focusing primarily on Moldova and Bosnia, and the 
implications that these neo-Ottoman policies have on Turkey’s relationship to the Euro-
pean Union.
2. Background History
 The history of Turkey’s quest to become a full member of the European Union 
(EU) is a long and tumultuous one. In 1963, through the Association Agreement between 
Turkey and the European Economic Community, the predecessor to the EU, the prospect 
of full membership for Turkey begun. Turkey’s application was first deferred in 1987, in 
which the European Commission cited Turkey as having an unfavorable political environ-
ment in which to begin negotiations (retrieved from the Turkish Embassy in London Ar-
chives). In 1999, the European Council granted Turkey the status of candidate country for 
the European Union during the Helsinki Summit (Onis, 2000). This decision from the EC 
came with conditions which Turkey had to resolve in order to begin ascension discussions, 
based on the Copenhagen Criteria for membership. The EU decided, at the December 
2002 Copenhagen European Council meeting, that it would open negotiations with Tur-
key (Yuhannan, 2017). This decision led to accession negotiations for membership in 2005. 
Since then, Turkey has been trying to attain full membership in the EU, but many obstacles 
have turned their ascension into a decades long case. 
 Egemen Bağış, former Minister for Relations with the EU, stated that Turkey 
would never become a member of the EU because some of the members are prejudiced 
against Turkey (Spillus, 2013). He believes that Turkey will become like Norway, close to 
but formally outside the EU. The obstacles that have hindered Turkey’s accession to the 
EU, as indicated by Yuhannan (2017), include many political, economic, and social issues. 
Some critics of the EU’s action against Turkey believe that it is due to Turkey being never 
recognized as a “real” European country. Geographically, Turkey lies between the East and 
West, with around 90% of land in Asia. This argument states that because Turkey’s main-
land does not lie in Europe, it does not make it a European state. Nicholas Sarkozy, former 
President of France from 2007 to 2012, has publicly rejected Turkey’s membership in the 
EU, claiming that Turkey is culturally incompatible with Europe and argued that Turkey 
should thus maintain only a partnership with the EU, not full membership (Paul, 2012). 
However, this debate on whether Turkey is a true European nation or not is met with 
criticism. Turkey has been a prominent player in European geopolitical environment for 
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more than six centuries, and was formally declared “European” by the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1961 (Yuhannan, 2017). 
 Turkey has faced major backlash for decades now for their denial of the Armenian 
genocide. Yuhannan argues that it is in the interest of Turkish people and their future to 
acknowledge the role of the previous government in the Armenian genocide (Yuhannan, 
2017). Their recognition of the genocide would allow Turkey to have a clean slate in the 
European Union, if it would ever be accepted to join. Many historians and scholars of the 
genocide have submitted evidence to the EU over the actions of the then-Ottoman gov-
ernment against Armenians and other minorities from 1915-1917 (Yuhannan, 2017). This 
denial of responsibilities by the Turkish government—the successor to the Ottomans—has 
created a sour taste against Turkey and any action they take towards becoming a member of 
the EU. Member states of the EU have urged the EU to add this recognition as a criterion 
for membership for Turkey, but in 2006, the European Parliament voted against a proposal 
to formally add the issue as a criterion (European Parliament resolution on Turkey’s progress 
towards accession, 2006/2118). 
 Another set of issues that has been brought up numerous times against Turkey 
and its accession to the EU, are Turkey’s political and human rights abuses. EU member 
countries have brought allegations of violating rule of law, as well as censorship of social 
media, against Turkey (Yuhannan, 2017). The Copenhagen Criteria play a huge role in the 
awarding of EU membership. The Turkish government must follow all these protocols in 
order to be eligible for full membership. Critics against Turkey’s accession have cited several 
instances of human rights abuses in Turkey, including media censorship and the treatment 
of minorities in the country, particularly the Kurdish population. 
 One could argue that, thus far, Turkey has abided by the Copenhagen require-
ments, such abolishing the death penalty in 2002. But, with the rise of Erdoğan and the 
instability that rocked Turkey in 2016 in the wake of an attempted military coup, matters 
have deteriorated. A year later, the European Parliament called for a formal suspension of 
Turkey’s EU bid in April 2017 (Reuters, 2017). The military coup of 2016 and the actions 
of Erdoğan and his government thereafter have hindered all of Turkey’s efforts to become a 
member of the EU. The Republican People's Party (CHP) has criticized Erdoğan’s Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) by arguing that they have used the EU membership process 
to undermine secularism and increase their conservative policies, and by doing this, the AKP 
has failed to protect Turkey’s national interests (Celep, 2011). 
 Turkey has recently begun shifting away from EU membership and looking to-
wards spreading their influence in the neighboring regions, particularly the Balkans. Their 
growing influence within Balkan states, which are also not EU members, has begun to 
intrigue observes as to whether Turkey is becoming a rival to the EU or a partner. The 
following sections discuss neo-Ottoman influence in the Balkans, along with two case ex-
amples, Moldova and Bosnia, in which Erdoğan’s policies have solidified Turkey’s place in 
the region.
3. Turkish Influence in the Balkans
 Under Erdoğan, Turkey has invested significant efforts into gaining political, cul-
tural and economic foothold in the Balkans (Weise, 2018). Increasing Turkish and neo-
Ottoman influence in the Balkans should not come as a surprise as centuries of Ottoman 
rule have influenced the region and encouraged population transfers. From data acquired 
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by Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research (SETA), a Turkish think tank, 
Turkish investments have dramatically increased in the region, from only $435 million in 
2002 to $3 billion in 2016. Expanding economic relations between Turkey and the region 
have drawn critics to Turkey’s reasoning for this increased influence and relationships. Crit-
ics argue that there is a religious component to this, based on shared adherence to Sunni Is-
lam, but this is not the case. In the following case study, we will examine the Gagauz people 
in Moldova, who are ethnically Turkish, but are a Christian group, which shows this is not 
a religious matter, as it is more about culture more generally and about increasing Turkey’s 
presence in a region often overlooked by the EU.
 Erhan Turbedar, a Kosovan scholar, outlines five key reasons that explain Turkey’s 
increasing influence in the Balkans. The first one is simple: there is a common history be-
tween Turkic people and the peoples of the Balkans. Second is a human factor: Turbedar 
states that more than one million Turkic/Turkish minorities live in Balkan states (Turbedar, 
2011). These communities are important for Turkey’s foreign policy. The third reason is 
geography: Erdoğan has stated that history has shown that global peace cannot be main-
tained without peace and stability in the Middle East and in the Balkans (Turbedar, 2011). 
Turkey must make sure that the Balkans are stable, as because of their instability, conflicts 
can spillover quickly. The fourth reasoning Turbedar presents is Turkey is increasing its 
presence in the Balkans through improving economic presence. The fifth and final argu-
ment Turbedar makes is that Turkey’s policy in the Balkans is to also secure allies to support 
Turkey’s EU bid in the future (Turbedar, 2011). As we have seen in the preceding sections, 
Turkey’s accession to the EU is almost close to dead. One remarkable relationship Tur-
key has secured in the Balkans is with Bosnia—through building schools and institutions, 
Erdoğan has garnered immense support from the Bosnian government and people.
4. Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Bosnia and Herzegovina, being a relatively new nation having only gained inde-
pendence in 1992, has a long historical and cultural attachment to Turkey. Bosnia is an eth-
nically diverse country, which holds a Muslim majority. Sunnie Rucker-Chang argues that 
Turkish practices have historical significance in Bosnia, as Ottoman Islamic traditions are the 
source of Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Chang, 2014). The connection to Islam is impor-
tant, as Chang argues. This connection allows Bosnia to look at Turkey as a “kin-state” and 
vice-versa. Bosnia’s Turkish Embassy estimates there to be around 5,000 Turkish nationals 
living in Bosnia (Colborne & Edwards, 2018). During an election rally for Erdoğan held in 
Sarajevo in 2018, Bakir Izetbegović, the Bosniak chairman of Bosnia’s tripartite presidency 
declared that “...[t]oday the Turkish nation has a person sent by God. He is Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan” (Colborne and Edwards, 2018). Izetbegović went on to call Erdoğan Bosnia’s best 
friend and “big brother.” As seen in Figure 1, a survey by the Center for Insights in Survey 
Research found that out of 1,513 Bosnian citizens, 29% listed Turkey as the greatest ally of 
Bosnia. 
 Turkey’s influence in Bosnia reaches far beyond economic investment, and in-
cludes cultural and social institutions. The government of Turkey has two privately funded 
universities in Sarajevo, along with Erdoğan pledging €3.5 billion for the construction of a 
highway system between Belgrade and Sarajevo (Colborne & Edwards, 2018). Erdoğan has 
spread his growing neo-Ottoman influence into Bosnia by restoring Ottoman architecture, 
including mosques that were destroyed by Bosnian Serbs during the civil war. Erdoğan has 
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even gone to the international stage on Bosnia’s behalf by demanding revisions of the Day-
ton Agreement of 1995, which ended the war in Bosnia. This agreement is where Bosnia’s 
current tripartite presidential system comes from. In a joint press conference with Erdoğan 
and Croatian president Kolinda Grabar-Kiatrović, Erdogan stated that this agreement needs 
to be reexamined and revised, due to it being written and ratified so quickly, and that it 
also is the reason behind the deep ethnic divides within Bosnia to this day (Vladisavljevic & 
Buyuk, 2019).
Figure 1. In your opinon, from the listed countries, which is BiH’s greatest ally? 
(retreived from: http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/march_28 april_12_2018_bih_poll.pdf)
 Turkey’s increasing influence in Bosnia is political, economic, and social. The re-
lationship between the two nations is built along a century’s long history of agreements and 
trade. Critics of Turkey have argued that its influence in Bosnia is due to shared religion, 
Islam, but that is not entirely the case. As is evident, while Turkey has been using religious 
institutions to appeal to Bosniaks, it is also using social and economic influence to appeal to 
all Bosnian citizens, not just Muslim ones. As critics claim Erdoğan’s neo-Ottoman policies 
are rooted in Islamic influence, another case this paper analyzes is the Gagauz people of 
Moldova, who are ethnically Turkic but are Christians. This goes to show that Erdoğan’s 
policies are not strictly for religious reasons, but are cultural and economic, rooted in neo-
Ottoman tradition.  
5. Moldovan Gagauz
 The Gagauz people of Moldova are one of the smallest minorities in Eastern Eu-
rope. An ethnically Turkish community, not more than 300,000 members live in the Bal-
kans, and around 150,000 in Moldova (Menz, 2007). The biggest difference between the 
Gagauz and other Turkish groups in the Balkans is that they are Orthodox Christians, not 
Muslims. The Gagauz in southern Moldova date back to the end of the 18th century (Menz, 
2007). In 1990, the Moldovan parliament declared the Gagauz an ethnic minority whose 
homeland is Bulgaria. Astrid Menz argues that the Gagauz do not feel overly close to their 
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Turkish counterparts for two reasons. One is that Turks are Muslims, while they are Chris-
tian. The second reason is that the only Turks the Gagauz see are businessmen, while they 
are mainly farmers, so there is a disconnect between the two groups of people in terms of 
economic and religious affiliations (Menz, 2007). Although the Gagauz people feel discon-
nected from mainland Turks, they are still connected through their shared ethnicity and 
history. 
 Erdoğan has expanded his neo-Ottoman influence into Moldova and towards the 
Gagauz people. This is another sign that these policies are not merely religious, but also 
contain a shared cultural component within them. Turkey has been increasingly active in 
Gagauzia, the autonomous region for the Gagauz, through contributing to the development 
of the region. These contributions include investments and aid for health care, education, 
and infrastructure (Cantir, 2015). Along with these investments, Turkey has strengthened 
their cultural ties to Gagauz through educational development of the Gagauz language and 
an exchange program (Cantir, 2015). In his visit to the Comrat, the capital of Gagauzia, 
Erdoğan proclaimed that, although there is no physical border between Moldova and Tur-
key, he still sees it as one of Turkey’s neighbors (Daily Sabah, 2018). Erdoğan promised 
to support the Gagauz people and begin planning a possible Turkish Consulate in Gagau-
zia. Before leaving, Erdoğan gifted the Moldovan government two water trucks (Necsutu, 
2018). 
 Erdoğan’s commitment to the Gagauz in Moldova can be looked at as a kinship 
relationship, between two governments that share common culture and history. The case of 
the Gagauz and their relationship with Erdoğan is unique and important because it dimin-
ishes the argument some critics have against Erdoğan’s neo-Ottoman policies, citing them 
as his way of spreading Islamic influence, as this clearly shows this is not a religious issue. 
Erdoğan’s policies are looking to be more culturally based, rather than religious. 
6. What does this mean for the EU?
 Erdoğan’s and Turkeys increasing economic, social, and political influence in the 
Balkans has raised the question, is Turkey becoming a partner or rival to the EU? This 
is an important question to understand, considering the growing economic influence of 
Turkey within Balkan states, such as Bosnia and Moldova, as we have just observed in the 
preceding pages. In 2018 alone, Turkey’s exports to Balkan countries rose 22 per cent in 
the first five months and earned the country almost 4 billion US dollars (Buyuk, 2018). An 
important factor to consider when analyzing Turkish influence in the Balkans, is that it is 
mainly dealing with countries that are also not full members of the European Union. This 
is an important consideration because it means that the EU and Turkey can both offer these 
states different things, which could create competition between the two bodies. To really 
understand this question, we must take into account the economic implications that Tur-
key’s relationship with Balkan states would have for the EU. 
 The European Union is an enormous organization made up of 28 member states. 
According to the World Bank, the GDP for the European Union reached nearly 16 trillion 
US dollars in 2017, while Turkey’s GDP was 851 billion US dollars. Thus, the EU has a 
considerable advantage over Turkey. It is also important to consider that the EU is com-
prised of 28 nations, while Turkey is a sole sovereign state. The economic dependency of 
European Balkan states on the EU is unsurpassed and could never really be taken over by 
Turkey’s economic contributions to the region. 
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 According to data retrieved from the European Commission, the EU is the leading 
trade partner in the Western Balkans, accounting for 73% of the region’s total trade (Euro-
pean Commission, 2019). On the other hand, Turkey is the EU’s 4th largest export market 
and 5th largest provider of imports, while the EU is Turkey’s number one import and export 
partner. Further, the EU makes up around 44.5% of Turkey’s main exports. Figure 2 below 
displays the import, export, and trade balance between the EU and Turkey. In 2017 alone, 
Turkey imporated around €84.7 billion in goods from the EU, while the EU imported 
€69.7 billion in goods from Turkey. This shows the important relationship that these two 
actors have with each other regarding economic trade and dependency.  
 
Figure 2. Imports, exports, and trade balance in goods between the EU and Turkey, 2008-2017 
(retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Turkey-EU_-_international_
trade_in_goods_statistics)
 In the two cases analyzed in the preceding pages, the discussion of Turkey’s influ-
ence in Bosnia and Moldova’s is still valid, but there are some obstacles that could make the 
EU more powerful than Turkey within this region. For instance, most of Bosnia’s investors 
are member states of the European Union, and 75% of Bosnians support Bosnia’s accession 
to the EU (Colborne & Edwards, 2018). As seen in Figure 3, the EU exported around €5.9 
billion in goods to Bosnia in 2017. In comparison, Turkey exported only $348 million in 
goods to Bosnia in 2017 (Turkstat, 2019). Turkey is not as huge of an investor in Bosnia 
as it may look. Their contributions are still very significant and influential in the political 
relations between Turkey and Bosnia, but many other EU member nations are more sig-
nificantly conducting trade with Bosnia. In Moldova, Turkey has the upper hand with the 
Gagauz, being that they share a Turkic background and that their autonomous region needs 
recognition on the international stage, which Turkey could provide. On the other hand, 
based on economic data retrieved from the European Commission, the EU is Moldova’s 
biggest trading partner, with around 66% of its exports going to the EU. Although the EU 
is Moldova’s biggest trading partner, the EU’s trade with Moldova accounts for only 0.1% 
of its overall trade (data from the European Commission).
 Based on economic influence, the EU has an advantage over Turkey in its relations 
with the Balkan states, some of which are still trying to attain EU membership. Although 
they are not yet members, many of these Balkan states still conduct trade with the EU and its 
member states on a larger scale than with Turkey. Although it might not have a huge eco-
nomic advantage, Turkey’s investment in the Balkans, and particularly in Bosnia and Mol-
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dova, has made it a more desirable partner. Although it could not live up to the economic 
advantage that the EU possess, Turkey is offering more social and political advantages to the 
Balkan region than the EU can. Turkey is thus making its way to become a competitor to 
the EU within the Balkans. 
Figure 3. EU trade with Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2018/614775/EPRS_
ATA(2018)614775_EN.pdf)
 When considering the social and political contributions that Turkey has made to 
the region, it is right to assume that these Balkan states are looking more favorably towards 
Turkey and its willingness to help these nations. One might consider the idea that for some 
of these Balkan states, EU membership is far off and the EU’s demands and criteria that they 
impose on member states make some wary of accession. On the other hand, Turkey by and 
large does not make such demands on these states, and Turkey tends to be more respectful 
of sovereignty. Turkey has recently been becoming more anti-West and has been moving 
towards harnessing relationships with their Balkan neighbors that are in the same position as 
them in regards to EU membership. Now, some might be wary of why Turkey is choosing 
to expand into the Balkans and not the Middle East, given the richer Ottoman connection 
that it has with the Middle Eastern region. There is a simple answer to this: Turkey sees the 
Balkans as a much easier contender, given that it has more peace and stability, compared to 
the Middle East. 
7. Conclusion
 Turkey, under Erdoğan’s presidency, has begun to reinstate some of the policies 
and traditions of its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire. “Neo-Ottomanism” has recently 
begun to sweep Turkey, both domestically and through its foreign policy, particularly with 
states in the Balkan region. Aspects of neo-Ottomanism are very evident with Turkey’s 
engagement in the Balkans, which were once under Ottoman control and contain Muslim 
populations in several countries. As discussed throughout this paper, the argument that Tur-
key is taking advantage of the economic opportunities offered in the Balkans is only part of 
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the story. However, it is important to consider Turkey’s actions in the Balkans and how it 
relates to the long history of their accession to the EU. 
 Critics of Erdoğan paint his neo-Ottoman policies as “Islamist,” but we have seen 
that is not the case. Turkey’s growing influence within the Balkans, and especially with 
the Gagauz Christians in Moldova, has demolished the caricature of Erdoğan as being an 
“Islamist.” The turn in Turkey’s influence from the Middle East towards the Balkans has 
garnered a lot of support from the governments of these Balkan states. Turkey’s contribu-
tions in the Balkans have been economic, social, and political. The increasing influence by 
Erdoğan and his policies has raised the question of Turkey’s competition with the EU as a 
major power in the Balkans. Although Turkey is not and could never really be as powerful 
as the EU, its growing and strengthening influence in the Balkans could potentially make it 
a competitor to the EU.
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